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Abstract
Recently in this Journal Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) proposed a novel
way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national
external economies at the industry level. Instead of perfect competition and two in-
dustries, GRH assume Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. GRH
conclude that the equilibrium is unique if transport costs are low, that there is no
trade for high transport costs, and that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies when
transport costs are intermediate. In this note we reexamine the equilibrium analysis
under di⁄erent transport costs for a single industry (partial equilibrium) version of
GRH￿ s model. We con￿rm many of GRH￿ s results, but also ￿nd that there are circum-
stances under which there are multiple equilibria, including equilibria in which trade
patterns run counter to "natural" comparative advantage, and also ￿nd that there is
a pro￿table deviation to the mixed-strategy equilibrium postulated by GRH for inter-
mediate trading costs. We propose an alternative set of strategies for this case and
establish that they constitute an equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010, henceforth GRH) propose a novel way to think about
the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the
industry level. Instead of a model with two industries and perfect competition, as in the
standard treatment in the literature, GRH postulate a model with a continuum of industries
and Bertrand competition. These authors argue that with these alternative assumptions
the ￿pathologies￿of the standard treatment are eliminated. In particular, the equilibrium
is typically unique with trade patterns consistent with ￿natural￿comparative advantage1.
This is most clearly the case with frictionless trade, which the authors use to make their
main points. The authors then explore how the results change when transportation costs
are positive. They show that the previous results remain valid when trading costs are low
enough, while for high enough trading costs the equilibrium entails no trade. However, there
is a range of high trading costs for which there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies. For
this case, GRH postulate a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which ￿rms in the country with
the comparative advantage mix over two strategies: the ￿global strategy￿ , in which ￿rms
target the world market with a pair of prices (one for the home market and one for the foreign
market), and the ￿domestic strategy￿ , in which ￿rms target only the domestic market. Firms
in the other country pursue a pure strategy in which they target their domestic market.
In this note we show that there is a pro￿table deviation to the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium postulated by GRH, and then propose an alternative set of strategies and establish that
they constitute an equilibrium. The main di⁄erence is that ￿rms in the country with the
comparative advantage, when pursuing the global strategy, randomize across a continuum of
prices for the domestic market rather than posting a single price for that market. However,
this mixed-strategy equilibrium applies only to an industry in which a country has a strong
enough (￿superior￿ ) comparative advantage. Otherwise, ￿rms in the country without the
1In a Ricardian context, this means that the pattern of specialization is consistent with the ranking of
relative (exogenous) productivities when measured at a common scale of production.
2comparative advantage ￿nd it pro￿table to deviate and target the global market. Charac-
terizing the equilibrium for the case in which comparative advantage is not ￿superior￿goes
beyond the scope of this comment.
As part of this note, we also provide a formal analysis of the equilibrium con￿gurations
under di⁄erent transport costs for a single industry that exhibits Marshallian externalities.
We con￿rm GRH￿ s result that for low trading costs there is complete specialization, for high
enough trading costs there is no trade, and that there is a range of high trading costs for which
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. However, in contrast to GRH, we demonstrate
that when transport costs are low, the equilibrium entails complete specialization, but is not
necessarily unique. This implies that trade patterns need not be consistent with ￿natural￿
comparative advantage, and hence, as in the standard treatment in the literature, national
external economies at the industry level still o⁄er a theoretical basis for industrial policy, a
point which we develop in Lyn and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2013).
2 The Model
For our purposes we consider a partial equilibrium version of the model presented by GRH.
This allows for greater expositional simplicity, while capturing all the main features of the
problem at hand.2 There are two countries, Home and Foreign, labor is the only factor of
production, wages are exogenous and ￿xed at w and w￿, and we focus on a single good with
demand curves x(p) and x￿(p￿) that have a unitary price elasticity, so that x(p) = E
p and
x￿(p￿) = E￿
p￿ , where E and E￿ are total expenditure levels. The production technology has
increasing returns to scale due to external economies at the local level. In Home a
X￿ units
of labor are required to produce a unit of output, where a > 0 is an exogenous productivity
parameter, X is the total production of the good in Home net of any trade costs (see below),
2In Lyn and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2013) we explore the implications of our results for industrial policy and
the gains from trade in a full general equilibrium analysis.
3and 0 < ￿ < 1
2.3 Similarly, the labor unit requirement in Foreign is a￿
(X￿)￿. There are
two identical ￿rms in Home and two identical ￿rms in Foreign. Transport costs are of the
￿iceberg￿type, so that delivering a unit of the good from one country to the other requires
shipping t > 1 units.4 Markets are segmented, so that ￿rms can set arbitrarily di⁄erent
prices across both markets. Firms engage in Bertrand competition in each market. For
simplicity we restrict the analysis to the case in which demand is symmetric in the two
countries, E = E￿. Without loss of generality we set E = E￿ = 1.
As in GRH, we study three types of equilibria: complete specialization (i.e., ￿rms from
one country supply both markets); mixed strategy equilibria (i.e., ￿rms from one country
randomize over which markets to serve and the price to charge, while ￿rms from the other
country o⁄er to serve their own market at the autarky price); no trade (i.e., ￿rms from each
country serve only their own market). All proofs are in the online Appendix.
2.1 Complete specialization equilibrium
Let p0 be de￿ned implicitly by
p0 =
wa
(x(p0) + x￿(tp0))￿: (1)
We will use x and x￿ as shorthand for x(p0) and x￿(tp0), respectively.
Lemma 1 If
"
wa
(x + x￿)
￿ ￿
w￿a￿t
(x + x￿)
￿
#
x +
"
wat
(x + x￿)
￿ ￿
w￿a￿
(x + x￿)
￿
#
x
￿ ￿ 0 (2)
3Given our primitives, the assumption that ￿ < 1
2 implies pro￿ts are increasing in prices ￿a crucial point
when deriving the equilibrium conditions.
4By assuming X is total production net of trade costs we are essentially treating ￿iceberg￿transport
costs as ￿true￿costs. This is consistent with the assumptions in GRH. Treating X as gross production would
be more consistent with a literal interpretation of some production (t ￿ 1) melting away in transit.
4and "
wat
(x + x￿)
￿ ￿
w￿a￿
(x￿)
￿
#
x
￿ ￿ 0; (3)
then there is an equilibrium where both markets are supplied by Home ￿rms, with prices p0
and p￿
0 ￿ tp0 at Home and Foreign, respectively.
In the proof of this lemma we ￿rst establish that pro￿ts are increasing in prices. This
implies that the best possible deviation entails ￿shaving￿prices p0 and p￿
0, i.e., it is never
optimal to charge strictly lower prices than p0 and p￿
0. Since prices p0 and p￿
0 = tp0 imply
that Home ￿rms make zero pro￿ts in both markets, it follows that a Home ￿rm cannot make
positive pro￿ts with any alternative set of prices, implying that that there is no pro￿table
deviation for a Home ￿rm. The proof then turns to Foreign ￿rms, establishing that (i) ￿rms
from Foreign do not make positive pro￿ts by taking over the world market by undercutting
Home ￿rms in both markets, and that (ii) ￿rms from Foreign do not make positive pro￿ts
by displacing Home ￿rms from the Foreign market. Condition (i) is a guaranteed by (2) and
condition (ii) is guaranteed by (3).
To proceed, let ￿ = wa
w￿a￿, g(t) ￿ t+t￿1
2 and h(t) ￿ t￿1 (1 + t)
￿. It is easy to show that
(2) and (3) are equivalent to ￿ ￿ g(t) and ￿ ￿ h(t), respectively. Let g￿(t) ￿ 1
g(t) and
h￿(t) ￿ 1
h(t). Let e t be implicitly de￿ned by g(e t) = h(e t), let tCS(￿) and t￿
CS(￿) be implicitly
de￿ned by ￿ = h(tCS) and ￿ = h￿(t￿
CS), respectively, and let t￿
0(￿) be implicitly de￿ned by
￿ = g￿(t￿
0). We say that Home has a ￿strong￿comparative advantage if ￿ < g￿(e t) while we
say that Home has a ￿weak￿comparative advantage if g￿(e t) ￿ ￿ < 1.
Proposition 1 Assume that ￿ < 1 (so that Home has a comparative advantage). If Home
has a strong comparative advantage, then for t 2 [1;tCS(￿)] there is a unique equilibrium
with complete specialization, and this equilibrium has Home serving both markets. If Home
has a weak comparative advantage, then for t 2 [1;t￿
0(￿)] [ [t￿
CS(￿);tCS(￿)] there is a unique
equilibrium with complete specialization, and this equilibrium has Home serving both markets,
whereas for t 2 [t￿
0(￿);t￿
CS(￿)] there are two complete specialization equilibria, one with Home
5serving both markets, and another with Foreign serving both markets (See Figure I).
This Proposition con￿rms GRH￿ s result that for any industry there are transport costs
which are low enough that the equilibrium is unique and entails complete specialization.
However, this proposition also shows that there are conditions under which multiple complete
specialization equilibria arise. The reason for this multiplicity is that trade costs create a
wedge in prices, thereby making the distribution of sales across countries di⁄erent for each
equilibria: in the equilibrium in which Home ￿rms capture the global market, prices are low
in Home and high in Foreign, and the opposite happens in the equilibrium in which Foreign
￿rms capture the market. This makes it harder for a deviant ￿rm to make pro￿ts.
For concreteness, imagine that t 2 [t￿
0(￿);t￿
CS(￿)] and Home has a weak comparative
advantage, and consider the equilibrium in which Foreign ￿rms supply the world market. A
Home ￿rm may contemplate shaving prices in both markets in order to capture the global
market. Since comparative advantage is weak, however, this deviation entails losses from
sales overseas because of the need to sell at a low price in the Foreign market together with
the existence of trade costs. The realization of economies of scale thanks to capturing the
global market leads to lower costs and hence pro￿ts from domestic sales, but this is not
enough to compensate for the losses incurred from sales overseas. The deviation is then not
pro￿table, so a situation in which ￿rms from the country without the comparative advantage
dominate the global market is an equilibrium. An important implication is that for this case
trade patterns need not be consistent with ￿natural￿comparative advantage.
2.2 Equilibrium with no trade
Let pA and p￿
A be de￿ned implicitly by pA = wa
(x(pA))￿ and p￿
A = w￿a￿
(x￿(p￿
A))￿, respectively. We will
use xA and x￿
A as shorthand for x(pA) and x￿(p￿
A), respectively.
6Lemma 2 If
"
wa
(xA)
￿ ￿
wa
(xA + x￿
A)
￿
#
xA +
"
w￿a￿
(x￿
A)
￿ ￿
wat
(xA + x￿
A)
￿
#
x
￿
A ￿ 0 (4)
and "
wa
(xA)
￿ ￿
w￿a￿t
(xA + x￿
A)
￿
#
xA +
"
w￿a￿
(x￿
A)
￿ ￿
w￿a￿
(xA + x￿
A)
￿
#
x
￿
A ￿ 0; (5)
then there is an equilibrium with no trade.
Recall that the best possible deviation entails ￿shaving￿prices. Hence, (4) guarantees
that a deviation by a Home ￿rm to target the global market is unpro￿table, while (5) assures
the same regarding a Foreign deviant ￿rm. Let f(z) ￿
2
￿
1+z
1
1￿￿
￿￿
￿1
z
1
1￿￿ and tNT(￿) ￿ f(￿)
and t￿
NT(￿) ￿ f( 1
￿). Using our assumptions on primitives we can rewrite (4) and (5) as
t ￿ tNT(￿) and t ￿ t￿
NT(￿), respectively.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium with no trade exists if and only if
t ￿ maxftNT(￿);t
￿
NT(￿)g: (6)
Letting l(t) ￿ (tNT)
￿1 (t) and l￿(t) ￿ (t￿
NT)
￿1 (t), the conditions t ￿ tNT (￿) and t ￿
t￿
NT(￿) are equivalent to ￿ ￿ l(t) and ￿ ￿ l￿(t), respectively. See Figure II.
2.3 Equilibrium with mixed strategies
As in GRH, our analysis con￿rms that there is a range of high transport costs for which there
is no equilibrium in pure strategies. For this case, condition (2) is satis￿ed but conditions
(3) and (4) are not ￿the violation of (3) implies that complete specialization in Home is not
an equilibrium because Foreign ￿rms would deviate to displace Home ￿rms from their local
market, and the violation of (4) implies that no trade is not an equilibrium because Home
￿rms would deviate and seize both markets. Figure III shows how this corresponds to the
range of transport costs t 2 (tCS(￿);tNT (￿)) for ￿ ￿ 1.
7GRH argue that for this range of transport costs there exists an equilibrium in which
Home ￿rms randomize between a strategy that leads to only sales in Home (the local strategy)
and a strategy that ensures sales in both markets (the global strategy). The challenge in
constructing such an equilibrium is that Home sales are pro￿table while sales in Foreign
entail a loss, so Home ￿rms would be tempted to shave the Home price, thereby capturing
all the pro￿ts associated with local sales while sharing the losses in the Foreign market. In
fact, the equilibrium proposed by GRH can be shown to allow for a pro￿table deviation
along these lines.
2.3.1 Pro￿table Deviation to the Mixed Strategy proposed by GRH
Let ￿(p) ￿
￿
p ￿ wa
(x(p)+x￿(p￿
A))￿
￿
x(p), and ￿￿(p) ￿
￿
p￿
A ￿ wat
(x(p)+x￿(p￿
A))
￿
￿
x￿(p￿
A), where ￿(p)
and ￿￿(p) are the pro￿ts made by Home ￿rms in Home and Foreign, respectively, given
prices p in Home and p￿
A in Foreign. GRH propose an equilibrium in which Foreign ￿rms do
not export and charge a price p￿
A while Home ￿rms mix between a local strategy (no exports)
with Home price pA and a global strategy, where ￿rms shave price p￿
A in Foreign and set a
price pG in Home that satis￿es ￿(pG) + ￿￿(pG) = 0. Let
￿(p;p
￿) ￿
￿
p ￿
wa
(x(p) + x￿(p￿))￿
￿
x(p) +
"
p
￿ ￿
wat
(x(p) + x￿(p￿))
￿
#
x
￿(p
￿)
denote the global pro￿ts for Home ￿rms given prices p and p￿, and note for future reference
that ￿(p;p￿
A) = ￿(p) + ￿￿(p) while the de￿nition of pG entails ￿(pG;p￿
A) = 0.
We proceed in two steps. As a ￿rst step, we show that ￿(pG) > 0 and ￿￿(pG) < 0
implying that Home ￿rms make pro￿ts in Home and losses in Foreign. Consider the price
p0. The violation of condition (3) implies that tp0 > p￿
A, so charging tp0 in Foreign cannot
be part of an equilibrium.5 Since pro￿ts are increasing in prices (i.e., ￿1;￿2 > 0) and
5To see this, note that the violation of (3) implies w
￿a
￿
(x￿(tp0))￿ < wat
(x(p0)+x￿(tp0))￿ = tp0; while we know that
p￿
A = w
￿a
￿
(x￿(p￿
A))
￿. Let f(p) ￿ w
￿a
￿
(x￿(p))￿. Then we have f(tp0) < tp0 and f(p￿
A) = p￿
A. Since f(p) intersects p
only once and from above (by Assumption ￿ < 1
2) then it follows that f(p) < p if and only if p > p￿
A. This
8￿(p0;￿p0) = 0, then ￿(pG;p￿
A) = 0 with p￿
A < tp0 requires pG > p0. Note also that tp0 > p￿
A
implies ￿￿(p0) < 0 since it would be zero if ￿rms could charge tp0 in Foreign but now they
must charge an even lower price p￿
A. Since ￿￿(p) is decreasing (i.e., pro￿ts in Foreign are
decreasing in the Home price) and pG > p0, we then conclude that ￿￿(pG) < 0 and from
￿(pG) + ￿￿(pG) = 0 we get ￿(pG) > 0.
As a second step, we show that ￿￿(pG) < 0 implies that there exists a pro￿table deviation
to the proposed strategy. Let the probability of choosing the local strategy be q, and consider
a deviation to a pure strategy with price in Foreign equal to p￿
A and the local price just
below pG, say at p0 just below pG. The pro￿ts under the deviation are q [￿(p0) + ￿￿(p0)] +
(1 ￿ q)
h
￿(p0) +
￿￿(p0)
2
i
.6 Since p0 ￿ pG then ￿(p0) + ￿￿(p0) ￿ 0 and hence expected pro￿ts
under the deviation are (1 ￿ q)
￿(p0)
2 > 0. Intuitively, by charging a slightly lower price in the
domestic market, a Home ￿rm secures all the pro￿ts from Home sales while not incurring
more losses in Foreign.
2.3.2 An Alternative Mixed Strategy
We now propose an alternative mixed strategy equilibrium that holds when Home has a
￿superior comparative advantage￿ , where we use ￿superior￿rather than ￿strong￿(used be-
fore) because the two concepts are di⁄erent. We say that Home has a superior comparative
advantage if ￿ < l￿(b t), where b t is de￿ned implicitly by h(b t) = l￿(b t) (see Figure III).
Assume again that (2) is satis￿ed, whereas (3) and (4) are both violated. For this case,
we propose the following equilibrium. As in the equilibrium proposed by GRH, Foreign ￿rms
do not export and charge a price p￿
A, while with probability q Home ￿rms pursue the local
strategy of not exporting and charging a local price of pA. The only di⁄erence is in the
global strategy of Home ￿rms (pursued with probability 1 ￿ q): just as in GRH this entails
shaving price p￿
A in the Foreign market, however the domestic price p is now drawn from the
immediately implies that tp0 > p￿
A.
6Note that the ￿2￿in the expression
￿
￿(p
0)
2 arises because of our assumption of two ￿rms in each market.
9distribution
F (p) =
1
M(p)
p R
s
￿(y)M(y)dy
pA R
s
￿(y)M(y)dy
+
M(p) ￿ 1
M(p)
; (7)
with support p 2 [s;pA], where
￿(y) ￿
￿0(y) + ￿￿0(y)
￿(y)
; and M(y) ￿ exp
0
@
y Z
s
￿0(t) +
￿￿0(t)
2
￿(t)
dt
1
A:
It is easy to verify that F(s) = 0, F(pA) = 1 and F 0(p) > 0. The mixing probability q is
given by,
q =
0
@1 +
pA Z
s
￿(y)M(y)dy
1
A
￿1
: (8)
Finally, s is determined implicitly by (8) and
￿(s) +
￿
q +
1 ￿ q
2
￿
￿
￿(s) = 0 (9)
Formally,
Proposition 3 Assume that Home has a superior comparative advantage, i.e., ￿ < l￿(b t),
where b t is de￿ned implicitly by h(b t) = l￿(b t). For t 2 (tCS(￿);tNT(￿)) the equilibrium entails
Foreign ￿rms charging p￿
A in Foreign and making no sales in Home, and Home ￿rms following
a mixed strategy where with probability q they follow the ￿local strategy￿according to which
they charge pA in Home and make no sales in Foreign and with probability 1￿q they follow the
￿global strategy￿according to which they shave p￿
A in Foreign and charge a price p 2 [s;pA]
in Home according to the distribution F(p) in (7), with q and s satisfying (8) and (9).
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(a) Strong comparative advantage
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(b) Weak comparative advantage
Figure I: Complete specialization equilibria with low trade costs, ￿ = 0:3
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Figure II: Equilibrium with no trade, ￿ = 0:3
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Figure III: Equilibrium with mixed strategies, ￿ = 0:3
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